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Abstract: Islamic finance has become an integral part of the financial systems of the Muslim-majority 
countries of Southeast Asia. At the same time, Southeast Asia has witnessed the emergence of new 
capital market governance practices and arrangements that are both multi-scalar and multi-sited. This 
article suggests that rather than only looking at the scale and rescaling of capital market governance in 
the region, more attention needs to be paid to the shifting balances between regulatory expertise, 
market practice and societal expectations. Indeed, for governance practices to be considered effective, 
they have to straddle at times competing demands of authority and legitimacy. This dynamic is 
nowhere as visible as in the case of Islamic finance, which explicitly involves Shariah experts, trained 
in Islamic law, in its governance structures. This article explores the novel forms of governance to 
which this new market has given rise. It argues that Islamic finance – rather than the product of 
privately held beliefs – has become increasingly bound up with the state apparatus. This facilitates the 
embedding of Islamic financial principles and ethical concerns throughout capital markets in the 
region. Yet, Islamic finance has also become increasingly submerged within national development 
and competitiveness agendas.  
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The fallout from the global financial crisis of 2007-9 has, once more, exposed the limitations 
of state-based financial governance in an age of substantive and complex international 
financial interconnectedness. In particular, that financial crisis has pointed to the difficulty of 
holding to account international financial market actors and to constrain effectively their 
speculative activities and the various types of regulatory arbitrage – across jurisdictions, 
across regulators and across products - in which they engage (Rethel 2014, 72-73). The crisis 
has led to numerous calls for rethinking finance and its regulation. One issue that has come 
up repeatedly in these debates is the question of how to ensure that financial practice adheres 
to ethical standards, if not indeed incorporates progressive ethical values. Reform proposals 
in this regard have ranged from introducing (voluntary) codes of conduct for financial market 
professionals to more radical suggestions such as refashioning finance from a profit 
maximising industry to a social banking model that puts human well-being and development 
at its centre. In the sense that these debates do not only seek to address and mitigate financial 
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excesses that were brought to light in the fallout from the crisis, but more generally question 
the moral fabric of finance, and of economic activity at large, there clearly is a progressive 
element to them. What is at stake here is the question of whether a principled approach to 
finance is possible as opposed to the logic of “no alternative” to the principles of the “free 
market.” Islamic finance can offer some insights in this regard, as it explicitly advocates a 
principled approach to finance to ensure compliance with the Shariah, also commonly known 
as Islamic law (Rethel 2017).  
At the same time Islamic finance is no longer a niche phenomenon. Islamic finance is 
a rapidly growing segment of international financial markets. Recent growth rates of Islamic 
financial assets are estimated to be in the range of 15% to 20% annually; they have reached a 
share of roughly 1.4% of global financial markets. In Southeast Asia, Islamic finance has 
made even more significant inroads into domestic financial systems. In Malaysia, a country 
with a Muslim share of over 60% of the population and which has been at the forefront of 
developing both its domestic but also the international market for Islamic finance, Islamic 
finance has captured a share of over 20% of the banking system and more than half of the 
domestic corporate bond market. Moreover, Malaysia holds a share of more than half of the 
global sukuk market; sukuk are a financial instrument akin to bonds in conventional finance, 
but structured so that they comply with the Shariah. In Indonesia, a country in which around 
two thirds of the population do not yet have an account in the formal financial system 
according to the most recent World Bank Global Findex Database data and therefore are 
classified as “unbanked,” Islamic finance has nevertheless achieved a share of over 5% of the 
financial system.1 
Islamic finance is distinctive in that the design and marketing of financial products 
and services have to comply with the principles of the Shariah, the Islamic jurisprudential 
body of knowledge derived from the Quran. Stipulations include the prohibition of interest 
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(riba), gambling (maisir) and contractual ambiguity (gharar) (see Vogel and Hayes 1997; El-
Gamal 2006). Compliance with these stipulations rules out speculative financial practices 
such as short selling or margin trading. In this sense and from a post-global financial crisis 
vantage point, Islamic finance clearly contains progressive elements. Questions of equity, 
mutuality and social justice are key concerns in Islamic economic thought. As a consequence, 
Islamic finance seeks to foster risk-sharing and to avoid financial instruments where one 
party benefits from the other’s loss. Moreover, advocates of Islamic finance emphasise that 
the requirement of linking financial products to real assets gears Islamic finance towards 
supporting productive economic activity (Zeti 2012). Islamic finance thus is to be employed 
in the service of the real economy, not unlike how the role of finance was conceived in the 
Northeast Asian developmental state-type financial systems described by Johnson (1982) and 
others. On a global level, in almost all jurisdictions with the exception of Iran, Islamic 
finance co-exists with what practitioners call “conventional finance” – the mainstream 
financial system and its regulatory frameworks.  
The unique character of Islamic finance poses several challenges when it comes to 
conceptualising Islamic financial governance practices. First, it unsettles attempts to draw 
clear lines between public and private and perhaps even civil forms of governance and 
associated knowledge practices. Drawing on the interpretation of religious texts, the Shariah 
clearly derives from outside the state and could thus be thought to constitute a “private,” that 
is non-state, form of regulation.2 Yet, in practice and as will be discussed in more detail 
below, in the two countries on which this article focuses, namely Indonesia and Malaysia, 
Shariah governance is deeply enmeshed with statist practices. Second, and related, Islamic 
finance challenges commonly held understandings as to the character of regulation. 
Typically, regulation is portrayed as public constraints imposed on the behaviour of market 
actors, with the additional caveat that much of international financial law is “soft,” that is 
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non-binding and hence difficult to enforce. Yet, financial institutions seeking the designation 
of being “Islamic” voluntarily subject themselves to another layer of regulation and public 
scrutiny. This is not unlike the case of palm oil discussed by Nesadurai (2018) in this issue. 
Third and following from this, Islamic finance and its associated governance practices 
challenge dichotomous understandings of the “local” and the “regional/global.” As a 
universal religious code, the Shariah is clearly global in intention, aimed at safeguarding the 
welfare and prosperity of the ummah, the global Muslim community. It could thus be thought 
of as a clear example of “transnational” regulation superseding national boundaries. Yet, in 
practice, Shariah governance is bound up in idiosyncratic local practices and organisational 
structures, which impose significant limits on more recent efforts to harmonise Shariah 
governance across the region, if not globally. To summarise, looking at the multiple levels at 
which the Shariah governance of Islamic finance operates generates insights into the ongoing 
rebalancing of state-market-society relations and how they are governed in Southeast Asia 
more broadly.  
The argument of this article unfolds in four steps.3 The next section situates Islamic 
finance vis-à-vis discussions of the emergence of more networked types of financial 
governance in Southeast Asia. In so doing, it will look at both the sites of Islamic financial 
governance, more specifically the role of state institutions, market practices and religious 
actors, and the scales of financial governance in the region. The section thereafter looks at the 
various models of Shariah governance of Islamic finance, specifically of capital markets, that 
operate in Malaysia and Indonesia. It traces how this type of financial governance has 
become institutionalised in these national contexts, as well as variations across the two 
countries and over time. The subsequent section focuses more squarely on how Islamic 
capital market governance practices are situated vis-à-vis the governance of other Islamic 
affairs and how they effectively constitute a rebalancing of relations between state, market 
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and religion, albeit in distinctive ways in the different national contexts. This is followed by a 
section that focuses more on the scales and rescaling of Islamic financial governance 
including an emerging regional dimension that manifests itself in particular through efforts to 
harmonise Shariah governance via more and less formal networks of Shariah scholars, and 
via the regional ambitions of market actors. The final section reviews the core arguments of 
this article and concludes. 
 
ISLAMIC FINANCE: NEW MARKET, NOVEL FORMS OF GOVERNANCE 
In the wake of the financial crisis of 1997-1998, financial governance in Southeast Asia has 
become increasingly networked. Various inter-governmental fora and dialogues as well as 
training schemes have been created in which financial policymakers interact regularly with 
each other and exchange knowledge. Considerable efforts have been undertaken to 
understand the drivers behind and effectiveness of this rescaling of financial market 
governance (see Nesadurai 2009; Rethel 2010; Hameiri and Jones 2015). However, in the 
design of binding regulations and their enforcement, authority remains firmly rooted within 
the nation-state and the financial bureaucracy comprised of central banks, monetary 
authorities, securities commissions and their like (Hamilton-Hart 2002). Nevertheless, whilst 
state actors remain the most important agents of financial governance, it would be wrong to 
study them in isolation, especially as they also draw their legitimacy and hence effectiveness 
from their relations with both market and societal actors.  
At the same time, domestic financial systems in the region have undergone significant 
changes. Two key developments in this regard are: the progressively more important role of 
dis-intermediated capital market finance (see Rethel and Sinclair 2014); and, especially in the 
case of Muslim Southeast Asia, the growing importance of Islamic finance, more specifically 
of financial products and services structured so that they comply with the Shariah (Venardos 
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2006). These shifts have entailed important changes to both how regulatory expertise is 
constructed and perceived and how a much broader range of social actors is seen as an 
important force in markets, in particular the region’s growing middle classes.  
On the one hand, there have been deliberate efforts to bring market expertise and 
performance measures into the regulatory apparatus. For example, state investors, which are 
also referred to as government-linked investment companies, such as Temasek in Singapore 
and Khazanah in Malaysia have sought to incorporate market expertise and best practice in 
their operations and introduced market-oriented performance measures for senior staff (see 
Lai 2012; Fini and Rethel 2013). The same holds true for regulatory agencies and personnel, 
where greater market orientation has found its expression for instance in the adoption of 
similar performance metrics. On the other hand, regulators are undertaking significant 
outreach efforts to bring in societal actors and middle-class investors, for example through 
operating capital market schools such as the ones launched by the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
in 2012 and which literally include housewives (ibu rumah tangga) in their target audience 
(IDX 2015). What has perhaps received less attention is the extent to which these new 
investors bring their own values – and importantly in Muslim Southeast Asia this includes 
religious beliefs – to the market. Indeed, a growing body of literature seems to affirm the 
notion that once a certain income threshold has been reached, Muslim consumers are more 
likely to prefer financial products that comply with the Shariah (see Pepinsky 2013). This is 
part of a wider, rapidly growing Islamic economy which, including halal food and lifestyle 
products, has to be put at a size of around US$4 trillion globally according to recent estimates 
(Thomson Reuters Zawya 2015). 
The rescaling of economic governance in Southeast Asia therefore entails both 
ongoing negotiations between different sites of authority and expertise, be it state, market or 
even society at large, as well as a politics of scale that crosses from the individual and 
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privately held beliefs to the national, the regional and in some instances even the global levels 
and back. Moreover, this is not simply a story of authority moving uniformly in one direction, 
for example from society to state or from state to market, but it is a highly uneven and partial 
process in which various social interests compete at times fiercely to retain and shore up their 
control and influence and spend considerable resources on both promoting and subverting 
these trends. Neither is this merely a tale of functional specialisation in which an economic 
problem, such as the question of how to create resilient and efficient financial systems or 
perhaps even more idealistically how to incorporate progressive economic and social values 
in financial market activity, is addressed at the level where actors are most equipped to deal 
with this issue. And indeed in the case of financial markets, which affect both individual and 
national prosperity and well-being but are also intimately tied up with global circuits of 
capital, it is not clear what level should be accorded the most functional efficiency (see 
Hameiri and Wilson 2015; Breslin and Wilson 2015).  
The case of Islamic finance is especially intriguing in this regard, as it ostensibly 
draws on values derived from outside the secular and very much Anglo-American dominated 
backdrop against which much of the financial innovation and (de-)regulation of recent 
decades has to be situated. Islamic finance in its current guise is a distinctively modern 
phenomenon. First experiments with infusing Islamic values with local financial practice took 
place in former British colonies at the middle of the last century. In 1963, the Muslim 
Pilgrims Savings Institution, later to evolve into the Lembaga Tabung Haji or Pilgrim’s Fund 
Board, was created in Malaysia, making it perhaps the oldest Islamic financial institution that 
survived from this period. It was set up to aid Muslim Malays to save for the haj (pilgrimage) 
– one of the five pillars of Islam. The aftermath of the oil shocks of the 1970s, in combination 
with Islamic revival, saw the creation of the Islamic Development Bank in 1974, swiftly 
followed by the establishment of the first private Islamic banks in the Middle East from the 
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mid-1970s onwards. However, it was only from the late 1990s onwards that Islamic finance 
really gained traction in international financial markets, evidenced for example by the market 
entry of big conventional financial firms such as HSBC and Citibank (Warde 2010, 70-85).   
The requirement that Islamic financial products and services comply with the 
principles of Islamic law has given rise to a somewhat unique governance challenge: how to 
ensure Shariah compliance in both form and substance? In its most basic form, this challenge 
is addressed by asking religious experts to confirm the Shariah-compliance of any given 
product that is to be labelled “Islamic.” However, from this basic precept, a more complex 
body of national and even transnational governance arrangements has emerged to both ensure 
Shariah compliance and foster the development of the Islamic finance sector more broadly. 
Whilst the emergence of novel forms of governance for a new market is in itself not 
surprising, what is striking is the strong resemblance that these developing governance 
structures for Islamic finance bear to the novel forms of governance discussed in this Special 
Issue and in the economic governance literature more broadly. In particular two issues stand 
out in this regard. These are: (i) the growing recognition that successful and not only multi-
stakeholder governance arrangements deliberately bring together diversely situated actors, for 
example market players, state regulators, representatives from civil society organisations and 
so on, who command different types of expertise and derive their legitimacy from different 
sources; and (ii) the preponderance of non-binding rules, soft law and absence of clearly 
delineated enforcement mechanisms and the challenges associated with this. These two trends 
are also common to other cases, including Ba’s (2018) contribution on maritime safety 
regimes, Bünte’s (2018) case study of mining governance and the palm oil case discussed by 
Nesadurai (2018).  
The case of Islamic finance is somewhat distinctive in this regard as it explicitly seeks 
to incorporate the expert knowledge of religious scholars into its governance frameworks. 
9 
 
However, the way this is done differs significantly in the two countries whose experience is 
subject to scrutiny in this article. To analyse this emerging governance system, a wider range 
of actors and practices has to be considered than just those within the immediate purview of 
the state, and within it the financial bureaucracy. Indeed, it is in the analysis of how state 
institutions interact with other actors and their relevant expertise that important analytical 
insights can be gained. 
In this regard, governance through Shariah boards has emerged as a key mechanism 
in the Islamic legitimation of Islamic financial products and services. Models of Shariah 
governance vary across countries as will be discussed in more detail in the next section. 
Typically, Shariah boards operate at the firm level, advising financial institutions on the 
Shariah compliance of the products they develop and market. Here, the Shariah board 
customarily derives its authority from the reputation of the scholars specialised in Islamic 
jurisprudence who compose it. Thus, for example, when a new firm enters the Islamic finance 
sector and tests the waters with a new instrument it can use the services of a Shariah advisory 
firm to get the product signed off. Typically, however, Islamic financial institutions have 
standing committees that meet on a regular basis. The number of scholars on these Shariah 
boards and their professional backgrounds can vary and may also depend on the interest of 
the institution in attracting customers from outside its home country.4 Whilst most accounts 
focus on different Shariah interpretations and the multiple schools of Islamic thought, it is 
important to note that there is also a comparative political economy dimension to how 
Shariah governance operates in practice and how Shariah boards are organised. 
In a number of countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia as will be discussed in 
more detail below, there also exist Shariah boards or advisory councils at the national level, 
which hold the ultimate authority in ruling on what is compliant or non-compliant with the 
principles of the Shariah. This is meant to ensure consistency of Shariah interpretation and to 
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provide market participants with greater certainty (Lai 2015). In many countries, a major 
challenge is to find Shariah scholars who are not only proficient in Islamic jurisprudence but 
also have a good understanding of how financial markets work (Pollard and Samers 2007). In 
some cases this shortage is compounded by regulatory stipulations that mandate that Shariah 
scholars cannot sit on more than one board per industry (that is banking, capital markets, 
takaful insurance) to avoid conflicts of interests. These are national limits which do not 
prevent Shariah scholars to sit on further boards in other jurisdictions and consequently a 
potentially important dimension of the transnationalisation of Shariah governance. 
The legal opinions issued with regard to the Shariah compliance or not of specific 
Islamic financial products and practices have the character of a fatwa. In Islamic law, fatawa 
(commonly also referred to as fatwas) are opinions issued in response to the question of 
whether a good or activity is haram (prohibited) or halal (permissible) (Devaraj 2005). 
Hence, fatwas are effectively scholarly opinions drawn from the individual scholar’s 
knowledge of the Shariah and the subject matter. Binding on the issuer, fatwas are an 
inherently “private” form of governance, relying on the voluntary compliance of the person 
who sought the fatwa with the verdict of the Shariah expert. Once more, one might think, the 
way that Shariah compliance is ensured strongly resonates with key tenets in the economic 
governance literature, in particular discussions of “soft law,” characterised by its non-
binding, voluntary character (Abbott and Snidal 2000; Brummer 2011). Yet, in practice, in 
Southeast Asia, fatwas have become bound up with the state apparatus, be it either through 
the entanglement of fatwa making bodies and government agencies, the elevation of certain 
issues and corresponding fatwas to the level of national interest or the 
legalisation/codification of fatwas which includes their incorporation into a growing range of 
regulatory frameworks (Devaraj 2005). While this has been the case historically for example 
with regard to personal and family law pertaining to Muslim affairs, the growing importance 
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of Islamic finance extends this into commercial affairs. This is independent of the religious 
affiliation of the parties entering into an Islamic financial contract. Again, there remain 
significant differences in how this plays out in the two country cases, which will be discussed 
in more detail below. 
In sum, not only is Islamic finance a relatively new phenomenon, but the way it is 
governed resonates strongly with the novel and emerging forms of transnational regulation 
and governance discussed in this special issue. On the one hand, this is manifest in the 
requirement of having the compliance or not with Islamic law of financial products and 
services confirmed, or perhaps rather certified, by Shariah experts. On the other hand, this is 
expressed in the ways that these confirmations actually operate, namely through fatwa. In so 
doing, the case of Islamic finance speaks clearly to both conceptual and empirical questions 
about the rescaling of economic governance in Southeast Asia and what this rescaling entails. 
The remainder of this article will look at the three dimensions of governance set out by 
Breslin and Nesadurai (2018) in the introduction of this Special Issue – structure, process and 
outcome – and how they operate with regards to the governance of Islamic finance, in 
particular of capital markets, in Southeast Asia. More specifically, it will look at how the 
Shariah governance of Islamic finance has become institutionalised as a form of public 
financial regulation in the two country contexts, the extent to and ways in which Shariah 
board rulings have become codified and translated into regulatory frameworks and more 
recent efforts to standardise and harmonise mechanisms of Shariah governance not just 
regionally but also globally. 
 
MAKING THE PRIVATE PUBLIC: INSTITUTIONALISING SHARIAH 
GOVERNANCE 
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Islamic finance operates alongside the conventional financial system and is as such typically 
subject to the same laws and regulations, both domestically but also with regard to 
international standards such as capital adequacy rules. However, at the same time compliance 
with the principles of the Shariah has to be ensured. Effectively, this means that religious 
actors decide which products and services are permissible and which are not. Following 
Avant, Finnemore, and Sell’s (2010, 2) definition of “governors,” they “evaluate and/or 
adjudicate outcomes,” in this case compliance or not with the principles of the Shariah, but 
do not necessarily embrace the more agenda-setting types of governance, on which typically 
the financial bureaucracy takes the lead (see Breslin and Nesadurai 2018). Both Malaysia and 
Indonesia stand out as they created national level Shariah boards in the mid- to late 1990s, 
relatively early in the development of modern Islamic finance in these two countries. Indeed, 
the success of Malaysia in developing its Islamic finance sector is often cited by countries 
that move from a decentralised model of firm-based Shariah governance to a model where 
Shariah governance is centralised at the national level. How has Shariah governance become 
institutionalised and embedded in these two financial systems and in what ways? 5 
The first Islamic bank in Malaysia was created in 1983 and was granted a ten-year 
monopoly. In 1993, the central bank, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), allowed other banks to 
open “Islamic windows” and in the early 2000s, these banks were required to convert their 
windows into subsidiaries. In terms of capital market development, the government took a 
guided approach and in 1994 BNM began to issue Shariah-compliant Government 
Investment Issues to enable Islamic financial institutions to manage their liquidity in a 
Shariah-compliant manner. The first corporate sukuk was issued by Shell Malaysia in 1990. 
Following sporadic sukuk issuance throughout the 1990s, the market took off in the early 
2000s both domestically and globally.  
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In Indonesia, Islamic finance was much slower to develop. The first Islamic bank, 
Bank Muamalat, was created in 1991 and the first Islamic window opened in 1999 (Lindsey 
2012, 111). The first corporate sukuk was issued by PT Indosat in 2002. In 2008, the 
government issued its first sovereign sukuk. During the early history of Islamic finance in 
these two countries, Shariah governance took place at the firm- and product-level. 
Importantly, however, both countries began to institutionalise centralised modes of Shariah 
governance in the mid- to late 1990s. In so doing, Shariah governance came to be 
increasingly bound up with the public financial regulatory system.  
In Malaysia, the Shariah governance of Islamic capital markets is to a considerable 
extent within the purview of the state. The regulatory body responsible for the regulation and 
supervision of capital markets in Malaysia is the Securities Commission (SC), a statutory 
body created in 1993 under the Securities Commission Act (No. 498) of 1993, reporting 
directly to the Minister of Finance. One of the core objectives of the SC is to develop 
domestic capital markets, including Islamic capital markets. In 1994, the Islamic Instrument 
Study Group was established under the auspices of the Securities Commission. Its 
membership comprised Shariah consultants and corporate figures. In May 1996, the Group 
was upgraded into the Shariah Advisory Council of the Securities Commission (SAC-SC) – 
actually preceding the better-known establishment of a similar body tasked with the Shariah 
governance of banks and located at the central bank in 1997. Endorsed by the Ministry of 
Finance, the mandate given to SAC-SC was “to ensure that the implementation of the Islamic 
capital market complied with Shariah principles” (SC 2006, 4). To this end, “[i]ts scope of 
jurisdiction [was] to advise the Commission on all matters related to the comprehensive 
development of the Islamic capital market and to function as a reference centre for all Islamic 
capital market issues.” Members of the SAC-SC are appointed by the king on advice from the 
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Minister of Finance after mandatory consultation with SC, but not with the Department of 
Islamic Development Malaysia, JAKIM.  
In Indonesia, until recently, the agency tasked with the supervision and regulation of 
capital markets was Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal dan Lembaga Keuangan, the Capital 
Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency or Bapepam-LK, established in 1976 
by the Soeharto government. With regard to the development and institutionalisation of 
governance structures for the developing Islamic finance sector, or Shariah finance as 
Indonesians prefer to call it, however, an important role has to be accorded to the Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia or the Indonesian Council of Ulama (MUI). MUI was founded in 1975 and 
is one of the main fatwa-making organisations. It is partly funded by a grant from the 
Department of Religion. At the time of writing, it was also the sole domestic body allowed to 
do halal certification, another important source of its revenue (Lindsey 2012, 114).6 In 1999, 
in response to the growth of Islamic finance in Indonesia, MUI established its National 
Shariah Board or Dewan Syariah Nasional – Majelis Ulama Indonesia (DSN-MUI) (Atho 
2013). DSN-MUI, with Shariah scholars drawn from both Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama, the country’s two biggest Islamic civil society organisations, has “responsibility for 
overseeing doctrinal compliance” of Islamic financial institutions (Lindsey 2012, 119). In 
2003, Bapepam-LK and DSN-MUI sought to forge stronger links by signing a Memorandum 
of Understanding (Atho 2013, 12). 
The move from a decentralised model of firm-based Shariah governance to a model 
where Shariah governance is centralised at the national level was an important step in the 
incorporation of Shariah governance as part of public financial regulation. In Malaysia, the 
developing organisation of Shariah governance closely matched the existing regulatory 
structure which since 1994 has been a two-peak system, with the SC in charge of capital 
market regulation and supervision and BNM in charge of the regulation and supervision of 
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banks and insurance companies. Until 2014, Indonesia had a similar two peak regulatory 
structure, with the central bank, Bank Indonesia in charge of bank regulation and supervision 
and Bapepam-LK in charge of capital markets. In 2011, Bapepam-LK and the regulatory 
division of Bank Indonesia were merged into Otoritas Jasa Keuangan or Financial Services 
Authority of Indonesia (OJK), a move that was politically not uncontroversial and resisted in 
particular by the banks, unhappy with OJK’s fee regime. However, central authority when it 
comes to Shariah governance resides outside the state financial regulatory apparatus. 
Nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that the way the state is entangled in 
business and the economy at large takes different shapes not only across countries but also in 
different economic sectors. In the case of the Shariah governance of Islamic capital markets, 
we can identify two types of state-orchestration: regulative and constitutive functions. 
Whereas in Malaysia, the developmental ambition of “creating a more organised and efficient 
Islamic capital market” (SC 2006, v) was a clear driver of the centralisation of Shariah 
governance, in Indonesia, considerations of doctrinal purity as endorsed and understood by 
DSN-MUI were the primary motive. Whilst in both countries the state, in particular the 
financial bureaucracy, was highly instrumental in giving these new forms of financial 
governance their shape and status as will be outlined further in the next section, in Malaysia 
the public regulation of the Shariah governance of Islamic finance is at one remove from the 
religious bureaucracy, whereas in Indonesia it is closely entangled with the latter. 
Moreover, what we have seen in recent years is the emergence of a broader 
governance framework for Islamic finance in Malaysia, intimately linked to the country’s 
developmental ambitions and international competitiveness agenda (see Rudnyckyj 2013; Lai 
2015). This goes beyond product regulation or the narrow Shariah governance of Islamic 
capital markets and includes measures linked to the internationalisation of the sector such as 
the easing of market entry for foreign Islamic banks, more permissive labour regulation and 
16 
 
the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions. Similarly, fiscal incentives – from stamp duty 
waivers and tax deductibility of issuance costs in 2003 over the introduction of a “tax-
neutral” framework in 2005 to the preferential treatment of certain sukuk structures in 
successive budgets – are used to foster the development of the sector. At the same time, 
efforts are underway to enhance the “Shariah quality” of Malaysian capital markets, in 
particular through introducing “Shariah parameters,” which effectively are reference 
documents that consider the practical implications of specific Islamic financial contracts. In 
Indonesia, on the other hand, Islamic capital markets have developed at a much slower pace. 
This can only to an extent be explained by the earlier stage of financial development 
occupied by the Indonesian economy. Until recently, Islamic capital market development just 
was not given the same significance as it was done by Malaysian authorities, which for more 
than a decade now have sought to establish Malaysia as regional and international centre for 
Islamic finance. For example, only in 2009 was a request made by Bank Indonesia to the 
taxation department to ensure sukuk were not double taxed (Jakarta Globe May 7, 2013). 
Deliberations in DSN-MUI were lengthy when it came to approving new types of contracts, 
and privileged questions of authenticity rather than market development more generally. 
The introduction of national Shariah boards in Indonesia and Malaysia represents a 
rescaling of both religious and economic governance onto a centralised body. However, the 
location of this centralised body within, or perhaps in relation to, the state governance 
apparatus differs. In Malaysia it is situated within the financial regulatory bureaucracy. In 
Indonesia, it is a separate body with close affinity to both the country’s biggest Islamic civil 
society organisations and the religious bureaucracy. Thus, despite similar efforts at 
institutionalising a more centralised mode of Shariah governance in both country cases, the 
ways in which this has occurred reflects specific settlements between the state, market and 
religious actors. Faith and the compliance of everyday economic activity with Islamic 
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stipulations are no longer the private matter of religiously conscious financial consumers, as 
the governance of Islamic finance has become increasingly centralised and incorporated in 
the governance framework of the state apparatus. Nevertheless, variations exist across the 
two country cases. Whereas in Malaysia, the public regulation of Shariah governance is part 
of the financial bureaucracy, in Indonesia, it is more intimately tied up with the religious 
bureaucracy as well as Islamic civil society organisations. Yet, how does the Shariah 
governance of Islamic capital markets operate in practice in these two country contexts? The 
next section will look in more details at the work done by SAC-SC and DSN-MUI and how 
the status of the rulings of these Shariah boards has changed over time. 
 
MAKING SOFT RULES BINDING: CODIFYING SHARIAH GOVERNANCE 
The fatwas of the national-level Shariah councils play an instrumental role in the governance 
of Islamic capital markets in both countries. Fatwas are the products of reasoning by experts 
in Islamic law; they provide an informed legal opinion about specific issues. Traditionally 
issued by individual muftis, collective fatwas have become more common and are the norm 
in Islamic finance. Scholars issuing fatwas need to be knowledgeable of the Quran and 
Hadith, but also aware of the views of classical and modern experts in Islamic law as well as 
Islamic legal theory and previous fatwas. Indeed, fatwas typically set out in much detail the 
reasoning that led to a specific conclusion. At the same time, knowledge of the subject matter 
is also crucial. Issuing a fatwa on Islamic finance thus requires a process of double 
translation: translating a financial market practice into language that can be understood by 
Shariah experts (who are not necessarily financial market experts) and translating Shariah 
principles back into market practices. It presents a significant challenge for the composition 
of Shariah boards in terms of cultures of expertise that seek to meld market practice with 
religious knowledge and vice versa. 
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The role of fatwas has evolved from the non-binding legal opinions which they are in 
traditional Islamic law to instruments of financial regulation. Similar to the challenges of soft 
law in global financial governance, codification by state actors has played an important part 
in turning fatwas into binding rules. In so doing, state actors in both countries do not only 
influence who the addressees of these fatwa are, for example the general public, Islamic 
financial institutions or even the judiciary, but also the status that is accorded to these fatwas. 
However, the role of state actors goes further as they define who can issue capital market 
fatwas that are being made binding. In other words, for Islamic capital markets, the state 
effectively determines whose interpretations of Islamic rules count and to what extent. Along 
these lines, the institutionalisation of the Shariah governance of Islamic capital markets via 
national level councils has been accompanied by a growing body of regulations and 
stipulations specifically targeted at the Islamic finance sector and Islamic capital markets.  
In 2002, Malaysia’s SAC-SC began to publish the Resolutions of the Securities 
Commission Shariah Advisory Council, with a second edition in 2006 and a third in 2014. 
Based on these resolutions, a separate regulatory framework for the issuance of Islamic 
securities emerged. Until 2004, sukuk fell within the remit of the Guidelines on Private Debt 
Securities, first issued in 1988, covering the issuance of corporate bonds and developed for 
the conventional financial sector (Ibrahim and Wong 2006, 115). In 2004, Guidelines on the 
Offering of Islamic Securities were introduced. According to the new guidelines, Islamic 
securities were deemed to be those “issued pursuant to any Syariah principles and concepts 
approved by the Syariah Advisory Council (SAC) of the SC” (§1.05a). In Indonesia, since 
2001 DSN-MUI has been instrumental in issuing a number of fatwas to steer the development 
of the Islamic capital market. These include several fatwas on permissible sukuk structures 
(for example No. 32 and No. 33, both issued in 2002) and Fatwa No. 80 on equity trading 
mechanisms issued in 2011 (see also Rethel and Abdalloh 2015). In terms of formal financial 
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regulatory authority, Islamic capital markets were governed by Bapepam-LK Rules No 
IX.A.13 and A.14. The former defines as Islamic securities those that fall within the remit of 
the 1995 Capital Market Law, and where both contract and method of issuance meet with the 
principles of the Shariah based on the fatwas of DSN-MUI (§1.a.2); the latter sets out a 
number of permissible contracts, in accordance with DSN-MUI fatwas. In 2015, OJK issued 
a further set of regulations, governing inter alia the application of Shariah rules (POJK 
Nomor 15/POJK.04/2015), Shariah experts (POJK Nomor 16/POJK.04/2015) and 
permissible contracts (POJK Nomor 53/POJK.04/2015). Thus, in both countries, public 
financial regulation bestows the national level Shariah councils with the ultimate 
deutungshoheit (interpretive authority) when it comes to the question of what capital market 
products and activities are deemed to be “Islamic.”7 
The importance of the SAC-SC in the governance of Islamic capital markets in 
Malaysia was further reinforced with the 2010 amendment of the 2007 Capital Markets and 
Services Act. Whilst the original version did not refer to the SAC-SC at all, the 2010 
amendment codified the existence of the SAC-SC.8 Moreover, according to the amendment, 
in case of different interpretations, SAC-SC rulings “prevail” over the rulings of firm-level 
registered Shariah advisors (316H§1), further entrenching the authority of SAC-SC in the 
Shariah governance of Islamic capital markets in Malaysia. However, most importantly, the 
amendment stipulates that SAC-SC rulings are “binding,” not only on financial firms that 
have referred to it for a ruling, but that indeed civil courts and arbitrators are also bound by 
its rulings (316G). Moreover, courts and arbitrators must take into account existing SAC-SC 
rulings and refer Shariah matters to the SAC-SC for a ruling (316F). In so doing, the 
amendment clearly sets out the relationship between SAC-SC governance of Islamic capital 
markets and the secular judiciary. Jurisdiction on Shariah matters is effectively granted to the 
SAC-SC, a development which Maznah and Saravanamuttu (2015, 205), referring to similar 
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manoeuvres with regard to the BNM Shariah Advisory Council, see as “empowering” the 
financial regulator and “displacing” the judiciary.  
Whereas in Malaysia Islamic finance disputes are decided by civil courts and 
arbitrators, albeit subject to the rulings of the SAC, in Indonesia Islamic finance cases are 
dealt with by the Religious Courts and the National Syariah Arbitration Body - 
BASYARNAS (Lindsey 2012, 109). And it is here that we can see another major difference 
between the two countries. Whilst BASYARNAS itself was set up by MUI, it makes its own 
claims to interpretive authority. According to one report (Hukum Online August 15, 2010), 
religious judges and arbitrators focus on the character of fatwas as non-binding and thus 
could potentially challenge the primacy of DSN-MUI as granted through state regulation. 
However, to some extent this is offset by the fact that regulations previously issued by 
Bapepam-LK and now OJK on permissible contracts are much more detailed, and in clear 
correspondence with DSN-MUI fatwas, whereas in Malaysia regulatory emphasis is put on 
clarifying and entrenching the role and authority of the SAC-SC. Taken together, the two 
cases point to variegated fatwa politics characterised by different degrees of embeddedness in 
the financial regulatory apparatus.  
National Islamic finance fatwas and the financial regulatory apparatus thus co-exist in 
a relationship of mutual dependence. Whilst fatwas to varying degrees serve as the bases for 
regulatory guidelines and laws, fatwa making bodies rely to a significant degree on the state 
for their status. However, there are also differences in how the state controls and regulates 
who can make these fatwas: in Indonesia, it is the organisationally independent MUI via its 
National Shariah Board, whereas in Malaysia it is the SAC-SC which is under the purview of 
the Ministry of Finance and SC. Similar differences exist where it comes to appointments of 
Shariah experts on firm-level Shariah boards. In Malaysia, the 2004 Guidelines set out basic 
requirements for Shariah advisers which were further specified in the 2009 Registration of 
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Shariah Advisers Guidelines issued by the SC. According to the Guidelines, Shariah advisers 
have to be experts in Islamic law as well as command several years working experience in 
Islamic finance. Membership of the SAC-SC as set out in the 2010 Amendment does not 
stipulate market experience. In Indonesia, authority to determine the number and composition 
of firm level Shariah boards (dewan pengawas Syariah or DPS) also rests with the financial 
regulator, namely Bank Indonesia (and now OJK) (Bank Indonesia Regulation 
No.10/32/PBI/2008). However, effectively DSN-MUI controls this process as DPS members 
have to be DSN-MUI approved and DSN-MUI makes recommendations about appointments 
(Hikmahanto, Yeni, and Yetty 2008; see also POJK Nomor 16/POJK.04/2015). 
Not only does the emergence of this new form of governance challenge secular 
understandings of financial regulation, but the ways in which it is implemented in both 
countries makes it difficult to locate this new form of regulatory authority as squarely being 
either state or market. Financial market knowledge, more specifically of financial market 
practice and the structuring of financial products, is undoubtedly a necessary requirement for 
Shariah boards to work effectively and to be able to reason about and make judgments on the 
financial products and activities they assess. At the same time, as the Shariah governance of 
Islamic capital markets has become increasingly part and parcel of the public regulatory 
system for finance, a disclosure-based system in which Islamic investors actively engage with 
the Shariah-quality of any given product and the reputation of the scholars on the approving 
Shariah boards, has been superseded by a regime of certification. In this, the state continues 
to play an important role both as legislator and in controlling who can act as a Shariah 
adviser, either directly as in the case of the SC in Malaysia, or through delegation as in the 
case of MUI in Indonesia. Thus, rather than leaving the implementation and enforcement of 
Shariah compliance to market actors – financial institutions choosing Shariah scholars to 
sign off their products and financial consumers accepting or rejecting the word of these 
22 
 
scholars - in both countries the state sets the framework within which the Shariah governance 
of Islamic capital markets operates and within which Shariah principles are defined. By 
making Shariah resolutions binding and in determining whose fatwas ultimately count and in 
what ways, states effectively delineate the agency of both everyday financial consumers and 
Shariah experts.  
Thus, studying the development of Islamic capital markets reveals multiple sites of 
governance and authority, which do not always co-exist in an easy relationship. Whilst the 
creation of national level Shariah boards embeds a clear hierarchy into pronouncements of 
Shariah compliance, these bodies must rely on further endorsement by state actors and 
codification in state regulations for their pronouncements to become binding. Despite the 
existence of competing fatwa making bodies, be it the National Fatwa Council in Malaysia, 
or the fatwa committees of the big Islamic organisations Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah in Indonesia, in both cases states have granted ultimate authority to one 
single body – SAC-SC and DSN-MUI respectively. It is fair to say that the creation of 
national Shariah boards is an attempt to “depoliticise” the Shariah governance of Islamic 
capital markets in delineating the space for deliberation and dissent, which in itself is an 
indicator of their contested politics. This is compounded by their bureaucratic nature and the 
politicised nature of appointments to national Shariah boards in both countries. 
Yet again, the ways in which Shariah governance is entangled with the state apparatus 
differs in these two countries. Thus, whilst Lindsey (2012), in an eponymous article, sees 
Islamic finance in Indonesia as a matter of “state syariah,” the comparison to the Malaysian 
case demonstrates the relatively greater independence of DSN-MUI, both with regard to 
where it is located vis-à-vis the state apparatus, especially the financial bureaucracy, and with 
regard to how it governs as well as its role in the governance of Islamic capital markets. The 
authority that states grant to national level Shariah councils with all their idiosyncrasies and 
23 
 
their fatwas makes it difficult to see how these governance arrangements can be projected 
onto the regional, if not even global levels. Nevertheless, in recent years there have been 
renewed efforts to harmonise Shariah governance as will be discussed in the next section. 
 
MAKING THE LOCAL TRANSNATIONAL: HARMONISING OF SHARIAH 
GOVERNANCE  
So where does this leave us in terms of progressive regional, if not global governance? One 
of the major developments in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis was the emergence 
of increasingly networked models of financial governance in the East and Southeast Asian 
region. This mode of governance was geared towards the further development of Asian 
financial systems, whose vulnerabilities had been exposed in the crisis, and strengthening 
regional safety nets. Whilst a lot of academic attention has been focused on initiatives in the 
wider East and Southeast Asian region (Nesadurai 2009; Rethel 2010), important 
developments have also taken place on the ASEAN regional scale. The emergence of 
increasingly regional approaches to Islamic finance is an especially understudied 
phenomenon in this regard.  
As the preceding discussion has shown, governance arrangements for Islamic capital 
markets remain tightly bound up with domestic political economy structures. At the same 
time, however, Islamic finance is a rapidly expanding international market. Even within the 
region we see a growing number of cross-border finance arrangements as well as Malaysian 
Islamic banks venturing into new regional markets, partly driven by decreasing profit 
margins at home. Moreover, Malaysia has both the ambition and the capacity to act as 
regional if not global financial hub and has promoted several initiatives in this regard. In 
2001, SC launched its Capital Market Masterplan, including the aim to establish Malaysia as 
an international Islamic capital market centre. This focus on the international dimension of 
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Islamic capital market development is further developed in the current Capital Market 
Masterplan 2 (2011-2020). Thus, high-level efforts have been put not only into creating the 
foundations for a thriving domestic sukuk market but also into achieving increased 
international salience. Pivotal to these are Malaysia’s ambitions to establish itself as a 
regional if not international financial centre for Islamic finance and its efforts to shape the 
processes of knowledge production that underpin the further development of Islamic finance. 
In August 2006, the Malaysia International Islamic Financial Centre initiative was 
launched. Its overarching goal is “to create a vibrant, innovative and competitive international 
Islamic financial services industry in Malaysia … and to strengthen Malaysia’s position as an 
Islamic finance hub” (BNM 2007, inside cover). Moreover, Malaysian financial policy-
makers have played key roles not only in developing the domestic financial architecture but 
also in shaping the emerging global governance framework for Islamic finance. This includes 
hosting the Islamic Financial Services Board, created in 2002 to develop global capital 
requirement standards for Islamic financial institutions (Rethel 2011). More recently, in 2011 
the International Islamic Liquidity Management Corporation was created to facilitate the 
cross-border management of liquidity for Islamic financial institutions. Based in Kuala 
Lumpur, its founding shareholders are the central banks of Indonesia, Kuwait, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, Mauritius, Nigeria, Qatar, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates and the Islamic 
Development Bank.9 Malaysia has been keenly involved in developing the transnational 
regulatory architecture for Islamic finance.  
Another important initiative was the launch of the International Centre for Education 
in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) in 2006 to “fulfil the human capital needs of a rapidly 
expanding industry” (BNM 2007, 28). INCEIF offers postgraduate degrees in Islamic finance 
as well as courses for professionals such as the Chartered Islamic Finance Professional 
Programme. Some Indonesian Islamic finance professionals have undertaken courses at 
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INCEIF. It also organises seminars that are attended by practitioners and financial regulators 
from both Muslim-majority and non-Muslim countries. There are clear indicators that 
Malaysia wants to shape the Islamic finance knowledge base by taking a lead in facilitating 
the production of those hybrid combinations of market and religious knowledge that underpin 
Islamic finance not just locally but globally. Along these lines, in 2008 the International 
Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance (ISRA) was created to promote applied 
research on Islamic finance matters and in particular to facilitate collaboration of industry and 
academia. ISRA is at the forefront of organising international Islamic finance knowledge 
exchange. In 2006, Malaysia initiated the Regional Shariah Scholar Dialogue (Muzakarah 
Cendekiawan Syariah Nusantara), an annual conference that brings together Shariah scholars 
from the Southeast Asia region under the sponsorship of the Malaysian and Indonesian 
central banks and facilitated by ISRA. It is a deliberative forum to “achieve greater 
appreciation and understanding … of the Shariah practices that are peculiar to the respective 
jurisdictions” (Zeti 2009).  
In addition to this initiative focused on Shariah scholars, there exists a whole plethora 
of regulatory and industry conferences in which Shariah scholars from the region regularly 
interact with regulatory officials and market practitioners. These include the bi-annual Global 
Islamic Finance Forum organised by the Malaysian central bank as well as several 
conferences organised by private providers such as the Redmoney Group or Middle East 
Global Advisors, often supported through state sponsorship. These conferences are targeted 
at issuers and investors and Islamic finance practitioners more generally. Knowledge 
exchange is further promoted via regulatory dialogues and courtesy visits, often held in 
conjunction with these events. 
Despite attempts to increase knowledge exchange among Shariah scholars, the 
composition of the national Shariah boards is surprisingly homogeneous. Thus, at the time of 
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writing the 11 members of SAC-SC were all Malaysian nationals, whereas the 36 members of 
the DSN-MUI Executive Board were all Indonesians. Having said that, previous iterations of 
the SAC-SC included Shariah scholars from Indonesia and the Middle East. Firm-level 
Shariah boards in Malaysia are more diverse, including scholars from other Southeast Asian 
countries and the Middle East, whereas in Indonesia DPS positions are occupied by 
Indonesians. However, the educational background of these scholars indicates much greater 
internationalisation, with university degrees taken at highly esteemed Muslim institutions 
such as Al-Azhar University in Cairo or Islamic University of Al-Madinah in Saudi Arabia, 
but also North American and European institutions. Furthermore, many of these scholars are 
internationally networked and serve on Shariah boards in other countries ranging from 
Morocco to Sudan. Whilst regulatory stipulations about single board memberships mean that 
interlocking Shariah boards are less of a problem than they are in the Middle East, one 
Malaysian Shariah scholar in particular, Dr Mohd Daud Bakar serves/served on more than a 
score of firm-level Shariah boards and has his own Shariah advisory firm Amanie Advisers 
(Bassens, Derudder, and Witlox 2011; Funds@Work 2009). Thus, again, we see attempts at 
harmonisation with national characteristics or “convergence within national diversity”, a 
phrase used by Lütz (2004) in an eponymous article to highlight persistent heterogeneity in 
financial markets.  
A key group of actors spreading Islamic financial practices across the region are 
financial firms such as the Malaysian CIMB or Maybank, which see their Islamic financial 
expertise as a competitive advantage and are keen on tapping and developing the regional 
Islamic finance market. Nonetheless, market access is dependent on approval by financial 
regulators and state control remains tight. Even though in particular Malaysia has eased entry 
requirements for foreign Islamic banks as well as migration rules for Islamic market 
professionals, which also extend to the registration of foreign Shariah advisors, state control 
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is still pervasive. In Indonesia, market access is relatively more tightly controlled and 
Indonesian regulators favour market entry through acquisition of existing Indonesian banks, 
also as part of an attempt to further consolidate the Indonesian banking sector. Indeed, the 
only foreign full Islamic bank in Indonesia at the time of writing is PT Maybank Syariah 
Indonesia, established via the acquisition of BII by the Malaysian Maybank. A number of 
Malaysian banks also have established Islamic windows in Indonesia, including CIMB which 
acquired Bank Niaga in 2008. Thus, to some extent Islamic finance has been at the vanguard 
of greater integration of Southeast Asian financial markets, but this is a slow and uneven 
process.  
In sum, whilst there has been not much institution building when it comes to Shariah 
governance frameworks on the regional level, there has nevertheless been momentum for 
fostering greater interdependence, if not integration. This has originated mainly from two 
levels: harmonisation of Shariah expertise and market integration. On harmonisation, 
whereas convergence to a single, universalised model of Shariah governance is unlikely 
given the heterogeneity of governance practices, there have been nevertheless considerable 
efforts undertaken at regional harmonisation, the development of global standards and 
knowledge exchange among Shariah scholars. As the integration of Islamic finance with 
global financial markets proceeds, pressure for harmonisation will increase further. 
Regarding market integration, over the last ten or so years, Southeast Asian financial firms 
have begun to increasingly reach beyond their home markets. This includes the ambitious 
expansion of Malaysian Islamic banks into Indonesia and to a somewhat lesser extent also 
into Singapore. However, it also extends to the introduction of cross-border sukuk issuance, 
involving firms from Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as arrangers and legal advisors, but 
also as borrowers and investors as well as participation in broader regional frameworks such 
as the ASEAN Collective Investment Scheme framework launched in 2014 and whose 
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member jurisdictions at the time of writing are Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. With the 
official launch of the ASEAN Economic Community in late 2015, these types of initiatives 
are gaining traction with regional politicians and financial policymakers, although it is 
important to note that the AEC framework specifically refers to “freer” movements of capital, 
but not the “free” movement (ASEAN 2008; see also ADB and ASEAN 2013).  
 
CONCLUSION 
Recent years have seen the rapid growth of Islamic finance in several Southeast Asian 
countries. At the same time, the emergence of new capital market governance practices and 
institutions in Southeast Asia have been both multi-scalar and multi-sited, although this does 
not mean that different scales and sites wield the same powers. The development of 
governance mechanisms for Islamic capital markets is an intriguing case in point. Thus, 
rather than only looking at the scale and rescaling of capital market governance in the region, 
more attention needs to be paid to the shifting balances between regulatory expertise, market 
practice and societal expectations and values. Indeed, for governance practices to be 
considered effective, they have to straddle at times competing demands of authority and 
legitimacy. This trend is nowhere as visible as in the case of Islamic finance as it explicitly 
involves Shariah experts, trained in Islamic law, in its governance structures. 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, efforts were undertaken to establish a centralised model of 
Shariah governance of capital markets at the national level, DSN-MUI and SAC-SC. These 
bodies are intimately bound up with the financial regulatory apparatus. Nevertheless, 
differences persist. In Malaysia, the supreme authority on the Shariah governance of Islamic 
capital markets is organisationally located at the Securities Commission, whereas in 
Indonesia it resides outside the formal state apparatus, but is implicitly dependent on state 
support. In both cases, an at times uneasy balance has been achieved between religious 
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establishment and state power. Moreover, not only has the Shariah governance of capital 
markets become increasingly institutionalised, but there have been concomitant changes in 
the status of the rulings issued by these governing bodies. Their fatwas are no longer 
“merely” part of a social/moral code aimed at providing guidance to pious Muslims on how 
to conduct their everyday economic affairs, but they have been turned into legally binding 
instruments, either by state fiat as in the case of Malaysia or by codification in financial 
regulations as in the case of Indonesia. 
Along these lines, we also see tentative steps towards greater harmonisation of 
Shariah governance, both in terms of market activities and permissible structures, but also 
with regard to underlying knowledge practices. Greater effort is put into building consensus 
in support of the expanding industry, where traditionally diversity of Islamic thought was at 
least to some extent celebrated, and perhaps one of the great strengths of Islamic finance in 
terms of its progressiveness. What does this mean with regard to developing a more 
principled, if not progressive approach to financial governance? On the one hand, the fact that 
Islamic financial governance is increasingly bound up with the state apparatus facilitates the 
embedding of Islamic financial principles throughout capital markets in the region. This 
means that Islamic principles and ethical concerns have become a mainstay of the everyday 
life of financial markets in the region. On the other hand, it is precisely this nexus that allows 
wider Islamic financial principles of equity, mutuality and social justice to be subordinated to 
national development and competitiveness agendas. The deliberative work of Shariah boards 
has been curtailed, to some extent by the sheer amount of material they must digest, but also 
because market practitioners and regulatory authorities are keen to bring new structures to the 
market in support of the expanding Islamic finance sector. Form seems to have taken 
precedence over substance. Taken together, the governance of Islamic finance in Southeast 
Asia is another instance of what Hameiri and Wilson (2015, 2) call the “emergence of 
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variegated forms of regional governance that do not take a formal multilateral form but, 
nonetheless, involve the rescaling of economic governance [at and] beyond the national 
level.” 
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NOTES 
1 Even in Singapore, a country in which Muslims only constitute around 15% of the 
population, Islamic finance is beginning to leave its mark. Indeed this is closely related to the 
country’s regional and international financial centre ambitions, the growth markets of 
Malaysia and especially Indonesia, but also Singapore’s strategic geographical location 
between the Middle and the Far East. Islamic finance also exists in Brunei, Thailand and the 
Philippines and there are regulatory considerations to introduce Islamic finance in Cambodia 
and Vietnam. However, in this article I focus on the two Southeast Asian countries in which 
Islamic finance has arguably made the most progress, both in terms of its share of the 
financial system and in terms of the range of financial products and services on offer. 
 
2 Sharia can be divided into ibadat (largely personal) and muamalat (community 
interactions), with financial transactions more closely linked to the latter which means they 
are reliant on some form of community authority. Thus, “private” does not translate into 
“individual” in this instance. I thank Afif Pasuni for making me clarify this point.  
 
3 This article draws on semi-structured and unstructured interviews with policy makers, 
market practitioners and Sharia scholars and participant observation at Islamic finance 
training seminars and industry conferences. 
 
4 For example, whilst the Sharia Supervisory Committee of Standard Chartered Saadiq, its 
Islamic arm, is composed of three Middle Eastern Scholars, the Sharia Advisory Board of 
Standard Chartered Saadiq Berhad, the Malaysian subsidiary, is composed of four 
Malaysians and one Singaporean (Standard Chartered 2015a and b). Some Southeast Asian 
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Islamic financial institutions seek to have a scholar from the Middle East on their Sharia 
board to attract investors from the region. 
 
5 For more detailed overviews of the development of Islamic finance in Malaysia, see 
Rudnyckyj (2013), Lai (2015) and Maznah and Saravanamuttu (2015). For Indonesia, see 
Lindsey (2012); Atho (2013) and Rethel and Abdalloh (2015). The history of Islamic finance 
in these two countries is rich and bound up with domestic politics and international 
ambitions. In this article, the focus is on governance structures for Islamic capital markets. 
Other important aspects of Islamic finance are not discussed in this article, including 
insurance (takaful) and alms tax (zakat). 
 
6 In October 2017, this function was assumed by the newly established Halal Products 
Certification Agency. 
 
7 A similar process was seen in Indonesia’s Islamic banking. Atho (2013, 17) discusses how 
Bartolini traces successive Indonesian Islamic finance legislation and how the definition has 
moved from banks that use the principle of “profit-sharing” (1992 Law No. 7) to “banking 
based on the principles of the Sharia” (1998 Law No. 10) to “banks [operating] … on Sharia 
principles … the principles of Islamic law on banking activities based on fatwas issued by 
institutions with authority of issuing fatwas on Sharia” with the same law later on identifying 
MUI as the institution with the authority to issue fatwas (2008 Law No. 21).  
 
8 The original Act only makes reference to “Sharia” twice (both in section 316), granting the 
Ministry of Finance the authority to “make such modifications in the prescription on the 
usage of expressions in the securities laws as may be necessary to give full effect to the 
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principles of Shariah in respect of such Islamic securities” (§2) and authorising the SC to 
issue specifying guidelines (§3).  
 
9 The list of founding shareholders and further information about IILM is available at: 
www.iilm.com.   
 
